Aldo Filomeno, PhD.

Aldo Filomeno, PhD.

Biographical information:

Aldo studied engineering of telecommunications and then philosophy at the University of Barcelona. He holds a PhD in Philosophy, supervised by Carl Hoefer and examined by Michael Strevens (NYU), Stephen Mumford (University of Durham), and Daniel Quesada (UAB). During his PhD, Aldo visited the Rotman Institute of Philosophy of Science in Canada and the project 'Causation in science' in Norway. After that, Aldo was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas at UNAM, in Mexico.

Research areas:

Philosophy of physics (esp. statistical mechanics); metaphysics; philosophy of probability.
In considering certain philosophical and scientific arguments we are ignorant of some relevant information. Classic examples are found in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. For instance, think of the ways the world could have been: we completely ignore the likeliness, if any, that this or any other world obtained. It turns out that how we represent our epistemic state of ignorance bears on the soundness of these arguments. My current research project consists in the assessment of arguments of this sort found in the philosophy of science, in light of recent models in formal epistemology for our representation of ignorance.

More details of his research can be found at:
and even more at:


Fundamentality, Effectiveness, and Objectivity of Gauge Symmetries.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 19–37.
It is not clear (to me at least) whether certain metaphysical questions really demand explanation or not. Some philosophers have argued for instance that certain issues related with Laws of Nature do not demand explanation. In this article, though, I propose an argument for why fundamental laws of nature (of a form similar to those of the current Standard Model) would welcome an explanation. The argument relies on Curie's first principle and on a feature of the current laws of particle physics. I also argue that this feature allows us to understand the ``unreasonable'' effectiveness of mathematics in physics (5.2) and to demistify any objectivity of these laws vindicated by ontic structural realists (5.3).

Abstract in a Presentist World
Metaphysica. Vol 7, Issue 2, pp.177–193.
Do abstract entities (such as numbers) exist? And do past and future things exist, or only that which is present? These two questions belong to two venerable areas that have been explored rather independently in metaphysics. In this paper I explore how to accommodate abstract entities in a presentist world. I consider both the orthodox metaontological approach of unrestricted fundamental quantification and then ontological pluralism. Under the former we need to impose two constraints in the characterization of presentism in order to avoid undesired commitments to abstract entities: we have to characterize presentism as a thesis only about the concrete and avoid the widely held distinction between tensed and tenseless senses of existence. Under ontological pluralism, instead, we can naturally accommodate any view of abstract objects in a presentist world.
Review of Michael Strevens' "Bigger than chaos. Understanding complexity through probability", HUP, 2003. [In italian]
'Aphex. Giornale italiano di Filosofia analitica', 10.

About Project

The aim of the project is to develop a formalization of epistemology in analogy to Frege’s formalization of logic. The core of the project centers around five theses setting out the path to a truly formal epistemology. These theses are based on a deeply held belief that the current trend in the formalization of epistemology is not radical enough.

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